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SpaceX Launch from Vandenberg: Falcon 9 Rocket Faces Engine Issues During Satellite Launch

Key Takeaways

SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket experienced an upper stage engine failure during a satellite launch from Vandenberg Space Force Base. The failure occurred during the launch of Starlink satellites, resulting in their deployment into a lower-than-intended orbit. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk stated that the cause of the failure is under investigation. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is involved in the investigation to enhance public safety and determine the root cause. Upcoming human spaceflight missions are likely to be delayed due to this incident. The Falcon 9 rocket has a history of reliability but has faced issues in the past, including explosions in 2015 and 2016. The first stage of the rocket landed successfully on a ship at sea after separation from the second stage.

Summary

SpaceX Launch from Vandenberg

On July 12, 2024, SpaceX faced a significant setback when its Falcon 9 rocket experienced an upper stage engine failure during a satellite launch from Vandenberg Space Force Base. This incident, which occurred during the deployment of Starlink satellites, has prompted an investigation by both SpaceX and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The outcome of this investigation is expected to delay upcoming human spaceflight missions. This article delves into the details of the incident, its implications, and the history of the Falcon 9 rocket.

The Incident

Late Thursday, SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket lifted off from Vandenberg Space Force Base, carrying a batch of Starlink satellites designed to provide internet services to ground stations and cellphones. Shortly after liftoff, the upper stage engine failed during its second burn, preventing the satellites from reaching their intended orbit. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk announced on X (formerly Twitter) that the engine failed for reasons that are currently unknown, and the team is reviewing data to understand the root cause.

FAA’s Involvement

The FAA released a statement emphasizing the importance of public safety and outlining its role in the investigation. The agency stated that the investigation is designed to further enhance public safety, determine the root cause of the event, and identify corrective actions to prevent future occurrences. The FAA will be involved in every step of the investigation process and must approve SpaceX’s final report, including any corrective actions.

Impact on Future Missions

NASA relies heavily on SpaceX and its Falcon 9 rockets for transporting both people and cargo to the International Space Station (ISS). The recent engine failure is expected to delay several upcoming missions, including a private citizen mission funded by billionaire entrepreneur Jared Isaacman scheduled for July 31, and a NASA mission in mid-August to send three astronauts and a Russian cosmonaut to the ISS for a six-month stay. These delays are necessary to ensure that the issues are fully understood and rectified before proceeding with human spaceflight missions.

Falcon 9 Rocket: A History of Reliability and Challenges

The Falcon 9 rocket has been a cornerstone of SpaceX’s success, known for its reliability and reusability. In 2023 alone, SpaceX launched the Falcon 9 nearly 100 times, revolutionizing the industry with its frequent and cost-effective launches. The rocket’s first stage is designed to return to Earth and land either on a coastal pad or a ship at sea, making it reusable and significantly reducing launch costs.

However, the Falcon 9 has not been without its challenges. In 2015, a Falcon 9 rocket exploded while carrying cargo to the ISS. The following year, another Falcon 9 exploded on its launchpad during an engine test. Both incidents resulted in thorough investigations and corrective actions, with the FAA ultimately clearing the rocket for continued flights. Despite these setbacks, the Falcon 9 has maintained a strong track record of successful launches.

Current Status of the Starlink Satellites

As of now, it is unclear whether the Starlink satellites launched on Thursday will remain in orbit or re-enter the atmosphere. Elon Musk mentioned that the satellites‘ thrusters need to raise their orbits faster than atmospheric drag can pull them down to prevent them from burning up. The rocket’s first stage, however, performed as expected and successfully landed on a ship at sea after separating from the second stage.

Table 1: Falcon 9 Launches and Incidents

Year Number of Launches Successful Launches Incidents
2015 7 6 1
2016 8 7 1
2017 18 18 0
2018 21 21 0
2019 13 13 0
2020 26 26 0
2021 31 31 0
2022 61 61 0
2023 97 97 0
2024 45 (YTD) 44 1

Table 2: Key Missions Affected by the Incident

Mission Scheduled Date Description Impact of Incident
Private Citizen Mission July 31, 2024 Funded by Jared Isaacman, involves private citizens Likely delayed
NASA Crew Mission Mid-August 2024 Sends three NASA astronauts and a Russian cosmonaut to ISS Likely delayed
Starlink Satellite Deployment July 12, 2024 Deployment of internet-beaming satellites Satellites in lower orbit

Conclusion

The recent engine failure of SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket during a satellite launch from Vandenberg Space Force Base highlights the challenges and complexities of space exploration. While SpaceX has made significant strides in advancing space technology and launching missions, this incident serves as a reminder of the importance of rigorous testing, investigation, and corrective actions. The involvement of the FAA ensures that public safety remains a top priority, and the delay of upcoming human spaceflight missions, while disappointing, is a necessary step to ensure the safety and success of future missions.

Hashtags

#SpaceX, #Falcon9, #RocketLaunch, #EngineFailure, #Vandenberg, #Starlink, #SatelliteLaunch, #FAA, #ElonMusk, #SpaceExploration, #NASA, #HumanSpaceflight

Artemis Program: Why a Moon Base Will Need a Transport System

Key Takeaway

The Artemis Program aims to establish a permanent human presence on the Moon, necessitating advanced transport systems to move astronauts and cargo efficiently. Addressing logistical, scientific, and technical requirements, these transport systems will play a crucial role in ensuring the success of lunar missions and the sustainability of human activities on the Moon.

Summary

  • NASA’s Artemis Program will return astronauts to the Moon for the first time since 1972.
  • The program aims to establish a permanent human presence on the Moon.
  • Transport systems are essential for moving astronauts and cargo on the lunar surface.
  • The 2024 Moon to Mars Architecture white paper highlights the need for lunar mobility systems.
  • NASA’s objectives include the delivery of crews, supplies, experiments, and habitats.
  • The Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) and Pressurized Rover (PR) are part of the Artemis Base Camp.
  • The Artemis Program is divided into three segments: Human Lunar Return (HLR), Foundational Exploration (FE), and Sustained Lunar Evolution (SLR).
  • The program’s initial missions will require enhanced transport capabilities for crew and cargo.
  • The lunar surface presents unique challenges, including regolith, lighting conditions, and terrain.
  • Autonomous and teleoperated systems will be vital for mobility on the Moon.
  • Energy and environmental considerations are crucial for the design of lunar transport systems.
  • Future mobility systems will need to be interoperable and capable of autonomous operation.
  • NASA will address these requirements in the 2024 Architecture Concept Review (2024 ACR).

Artemis Program: Why a Moon Base Will Need a Transport System

NASA’s Artemis Program will send astronauts back to the Moon. The last visit was Apollo 17 in 1972. The next mission is planned for September 2026. NASA will then build the systems needed for yearly trips to the Moon. This will lead to humans living there permanently. There will be a big need for cargo delivery systems. These systems must help with the needs of the crews. They must support their exploration with the right logistical, scientific, and technical support.

We need transportation systems not just for delivering crews and cargo. They must also handle logistical needs and help exploration efforts. These needs were described in a 2024 Moon to Mars Architecture white paper. The paper is titled “Lunar Mobility Drivers and Needs.”

It follows another paper called “Lunar Surface Cargo.” This new white paper talks about the need for lunar infrastructure. Such infrastructure will help move astronauts and payloads from landing sites to important locations. As usual, they found a big gap between what we can currently do and what we expect to need.

The authors again stress the need for mobility systems. These systems should align with NASA’s goals. These goals are outlined in the Moon to Mars Architecture Definition Document (ADD). The authors say recent studies show something important. We need transport systems on the lunar surface. These systems should move cargo from delivery points to usage points. This cargo can include crew supplies, scientific demonstrations, and large infrastructure that needs precise moving.

In short, in addition to landers capable of delivering crews, supplies, experiments, and habitats, NASA’s Moon to Mars program also requires vehicles and support networks that can deliver them from point A to point B. As they state, the currently defined mobility elements are either primarily for crew use or are limited in mobility. This includes elements like the Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) and the Pressurized Rover (PR) – which are elements of the Artemis Base Camp – and robotic missions contracted through the Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program.

In addition, the needs and challenges that will emerge as the Artemis Program unfolds are broken down into three segments: Human Lunar Return (HLR), Foundational Exploration (FE), and Sustained Lunar Evolution (SLR). The HLR segment includes the Artemis III mission, currently scheduled for September 2026, where a crew of two will land on the lunar surface using a Starship HLS. The FE segment will coincide with Artemis IV and Artemis V (2028 and 2030), where crew sizes will expand from two to four, and the necessary infrastructure will expand.

After that, during the SLR segment, NASA plans to mount a mission a year and establish a permanent lunar habitat. Throughout this period, the demands for payloads and transportation systems will exceed current capabilities, limited to 15,000 kg (33,070 lbs) of cargo. Similar to what NASA related in their Lunar Surface Cargo whitepaper, accomplishing key mission objectives will require cargo of sizes and masses beyond these capabilities, creating the need for additional solutions.

Mobility demand forecast shows how much transportation will be needed in the future. LTV stands for Lunar Terrain Vehicle. LRV stands for Lunar Roving Vehicle. These are types of transport vehicles used on the moon. NASA compared how well LTV and LRV could meet the future transportation needs.
Mobility demand forecast shows how much transportation will be needed in the future. LTV stands for Lunar Terrain Vehicle. LRV stands for Lunar Roving Vehicle. These are types of transport vehicles used on the moon. NASA compared how well LTV and LRV could meet the future transportation needs.

Isolation and Movement

As the authors state, a major issue on the lunar surface affecting mobility is the need for separation between landing sites and points of use. This separation is motivated by several factors, including science objectives, lighting conditions, and safety considerations. In short, crew vehicles, habitats, and key infrastructure will be positioned at a distance from landing sites so as not to be affected by darkness caused by the landers’ shadow, contamination by the landers, and regolith or blast ejecta created by engine plumes. Based on the level of concern, separation distances are broken down into three tiers:

  • Separation from lander shadowing: tens of meters (tens of yards)
  • Lander blast ejecta constraints: due either to separation between the lander and existing infrastructure or lander ascent (>1,000 m; ~1090 yards)
  • Support for aggregation of elements in ideal habitation zones from available regional landing areas: up to 5,000 m (~5470 yards)

NASA’s Moon to Mars mission architecture emphasizes the need for In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU), such as water ice, regolith, and minerals. NASA also recognizes the need to select habitation and hibernation sites that minimize the exposure to darkness from shadows caused by the local topography and the inclination of the Sun during lunar nights (which last two weeks at a time). This is easiest at higher elevations and on top of crater ridges. This necessitates two things:

  1. Exploration, habitation, and power sites will need to be located far from landing and ISRU sites.
  2. Traverses from landing to habitation zones could encounter slopes of up to 20 degrees.

As the authors state, these overlapping challenges can be met by ensuring systems are in place so mission elements can move away from landers once they are deployed on the surface:

“This could be done using independent or integrated mobility systems. The frequency of traverses between downslope and upslope locations would be driven by the cadence with which landers deliver cargo to the lunar surface and the mass that a given mobility system can carry on each traversal. Integrated architecture operations will necessitate non-trivial relocation and aggregation ranges for cargo and assets.”

Transportation Abilities

During the FE segment of the Artemis Program, NASA plans to expand surface crews from two to four, which will need to operate on the surface for about 30 days. This will require a wide range of mobility needs that can accommodate payloads of varying size and mass and over a range of distances. These include:

  • Smaller technology demonstrations: 500 to 2000 kg (~1100 to 4410 lbs)
  • Logistic Elements per crewed surface mission: 2,000 to 6,000 kg (~4410 to 13,230 lbs)
  • Habitation Systems: 12,000 to 15,000 kg (~26455 to 33,070 lbs)

The authors acknowledge that current mobility elements could provide some cargo relocation capabilities – the LTV, for example, can accommodate 800 kg (~1764 lbs) of cargo when uncrewed. However, according to the NASA team’s analysis, the mobility capacity falls short of demand by 1,000 to 15,000 kg (2,200 to 33,070 lbs) per asset for ranges of 50 to 5,000 m (~55 to 5470 yards). Moreover, the “frequency of relocation needs” (i.e., how often payloads need to be moved) will vary considerably, ranging from single operations for large elements to multiple trips a year for containers and smaller cargo.

Environments

The authors also address how lunar conditions are important when developing mobility systems. One of the greatest hazards on the Moon is regolith (aka. “moondust”), the fine silicate powder that covers much of the surface and sticks to everything it comes into contact with. There are lighting conditions where parts of the South Pole region will be shadowed due to the inclination of the Sun and permanently shadowed regions (PSRs) that experience perpetual darkness. Last is the matter of the terrain, which can be rocky or covered by 1 to 10 m (3.3 to 33 ft) of regolith and where slopes of more than 10 degrees are common.

This combination of factors, they argue, “creates a significant technological gap between existing systems and mobility demands for future exploration.” For starters, energy systems must provide enough power so vehicles can maintain sufficient speeds and carrying capacity and can operate during lunar nights. The authors also recommend conducting more studies on regolith mitigation strategies to prevent wear and tear and the effects regolith could have on electro-mechanical systems. They also stress the need for sufficient autonomy and/or teleoperation, allowing greater flexibility and range.

These autonomous systems must contend with the challenging lunar terrain, map the local topography, recognize obstacles and unpassable regions, and identify optimal pathways to reach their destinations. As the authors note, these systems could offer increased flexibility for mission planning and increase the speed of mobile assets, especially in areas where the terrain interferes with communications and makes remote operations impossible.

Artemis Program Why a Moon Base Will Need a Transport System
Artemis Program Why a Moon Base Will Need a Transport System

Energy and Environmental Demands

The white paper also addresses energy and environmental considerations. As noted already, lunar nights are two weeks long, which poses significant challenges for exploration and habitation. Currently, NASA’s Moon to Mars architecture does not specify how the base camps will be powered, though solar power is considered a safe bet. However, the team notes that generating sufficient power to accommodate lunar operations will require solar power systems with “surface mobility capabilities.”

They also note that lunar mobility systems will need to operate for 12 hours a day for up to 30 days and that proposed systems will need to deliver sufficient power to operate for six to twelve months. The thermal environments are also a serious consideration, with average daytime temperatures reaching 120 °C (248 °F) and nighttime temperatures going down to -170 °C (-274 °F). This creates issues for systems that are required to operate day and night.

Conclusion

NASA sees the need for flexible mobility systems. These systems will help astronauts and cargo move across the lunar surface. The systems must meet the needs of the Artemis Program. HLR, FE, and SLR segments define these needs. Current systems handle some mobility needs, but there is a gap. Future missions will need more advanced capabilities. The 2024 Architecture Concept Review (2024 ACR) will focus on these needs.

NASA aims to develop new mobile assets. These assets must work together smoothly and operate on their own without constant human control. The Artemis Program will rely on these assets for its first lunar missions in 2026. This includes delivering infrastructure and crew missions in the late 2020s. By the 2030s, NASA wants to have a lasting presence on the Moon. Closing these technology gaps will help astronauts explore and do science on the Moon.

Tables

Mission Segment Crew Size Duration Infrastructure Needs
Human Lunar Return (HLR) 2 1-2 weeks Initial landing and exploration infrastructure
Foundational Exploration (FE) 4 30 days Expanded habitats, power systems, mobility solutions
Sustained Lunar Evolution (SLR) 4+ Indefinite Permanent habitats, ISRU systems, advanced mobility
Mobility Demand Payload Mass Range Traversal Distance
Small technology demos 500-2000 kg Up to 5000 m
Logistics per mission 2000-6000 kg Up to 5000 m
Habitation systems 12000-15000 kg Up to 5000 m

References

Hashtags:

#ArtemisProgram, #NASA, #MoonBase, #LunarExploration, #SpaceTravel, #SpaceTechnology, #MoonMission, #SpaceExploration, #SpaceScience, #MoonSurface, #MoonTransport, #SpaceTech, #HumanSpaceflight, #Astrobiology, #LunarBase, #ExplorationMission, #MoonToMars, #SpaceColonization, @NASA, @NASAArtemis, @NASAMoon, @NASA_Technology, @SpaceX, @BlueOrigin, @BoeingSpace, @LockheedMartin, @Space_Station, @ISS_Research
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